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God, Kant, and the Transcendental Object: 
 an Investigation into the Kantian Critique 
of the Ontological Argument1 
 
 
Immanuel Kant spent a good amount of time attempting to clarify the status of the 
terms 'God' and 'transcendental object' within the framework of his critical philosophy.2 
Since then sympathetic commentators have tended to accept his arguments against the 
possible validity of an ontological proof for the existence of God as conclusive while 
concurrently finding his statements about the ontological status of the transcendental 
object difficult to understand if intelligible at all.  
 
I sympathize with their predicament, for I have come to believe that Kant’s arguments 
against the possible validity of an ontological argument for the existence of God are 
equally devastating when brought to bear against his own conception of the ontological 
status of the transcendental object. 
 
This essay, limited in length though it must be, is an investigation into the above 
possibility. It is my purpose neither to argue for the validity of an ontological proof for 
the existence of God nor to attempt a final clarification of the Kantian thing-in-itself. 
Rather, I shall contend that to the extent that the usage of the Kantian phrase 
'transcendental object' is clear, to that extent Kant’s arguments against the possible 
validity of an ontological proof for the existence of God must be invalid, for the method 
by which Kant established the ontological status of the transcendental object is strictly 
analogous to that by which a theological ontologist might wish to establish the existence 
of God. Either the possibility of establishing the existence of a transcendental object 
must be susceptible to a disproof such as Kant offered against the possibility of an 
ontological proof for the existence of God, or the latter must be seen as possessing the 
possibility of an equal claim to validity (at least within the critical limits of this 
discussion). 
 
 
1 I wish to thank Frederick Olafson and Donald Dunbar for offering comments and 
criticisms on earlier drafts of this essay. Citations to Kant by page reference within the text and 
footnotes are to Norman Kemp Smith's translation of The Critique of Pure Reason (London, 
England: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1963).  
2 Throughout this paper I shall use the terms 'transcendental object' and 'thing-in-itself' 
as being extensionally equivalent (that is, having as their common extension that unknowable 
"something" to which Kant refers loosely as the "cause" of those representations (appearances) 
in our mind. (Page 358). I do not wish to imply that they are intensionally equivalent either to 
Kant or to myself, but only that any intensional differences that exist between them are 
irrelevant to the concerns of this essay. 
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 Kant on 'Judgments' 
 
Judgments, to Kant, were either analytic or synthetic, and either a priori or a posteriori. 
An analytic judgment is a judgment of the subject-predicate form in which the 
"predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this 
concept A".3 The predicate of such a judgment adds nothing to what has already been 
thought in the act of expressing the subject itself. The function of the predicate of such 
a judgment, therefore, is not to add anything to the content of the subject, but rather to 
draw into sharper focus some particular aspect of the content of the subject. A synthetic 
judgment, in contrast, is a judgment in which the "predicate B lies outside the concept 
A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it".4 If the predicate of a judgment 
affirms of the subject something not thought in the act of expressing the subject, no 
analysis of the content of the subject itself could possibly yield the predicate. The 
predicate of a synthetic judgment, therefore, adds something to the content of the 
subject. To use Kant’s own paradigm examples, the judgment 'All bodies are extended' 
is analytic, while the judgment 'All bodies are heavy' is synthetic. 
 
An a priori judgment is a judgment whose truth can be known independently of 
experience. Such a priori knowledge is to be understood "not [as] knowledge 
independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all 
experience".5 In contrast to this type of judgment are those judgments giving empirical 
knowledge "which is knowledge possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience".6 
As convenient examples, 'All bachelors are unmarried men' would be a priori, while 'All 
bachelors are unhappy' would be a posteriori. The truth of the former judgment is 
dependent solely upon the meanings of its subject and predicate apart from any 
examination of the nature of the empirical world; the truth of the latter judgment is 
dependent upon just such an examination. (Or put another way, the truth of the former 
judgment entails the truth of no other empirical judgment [no other judgment, that is, 
concerning sensible experience], but is dependent solely upon either the truth of the 
judgments which constitute the definitions of its subject and predicate, or upon the 
truth of other a priori judgments. The truth of the latter judgment, in contrast, entails 
the truth of at least one other empirical judgment, namely 'At least one bachelor 
exists'.) Kant does give an empirical criterion by which to distinguish between a priori 
and a posteriori judgments: if a judgment is "thought as necessary", it is a priori.7 As the 
 
3 Page 48. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Page 43. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
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definition of 'a priori judgment' is not expressed in terms of this criterion, however, the 
judgment that 'All and only a priori judgments are thought as necessary' is itself 
empirical and non-a priori. Not wishing to become involved in the complexities of a non-
necessary criterion based upon the concept of necessity, therefore, I shall disregard the 
criterion as non-essential to this discussion and accept Kant’s definition of 'a priori 
judgment' as sufficiently clear for my purposes. 
 
Given the above distinctions, an arbitrary judgment may at first glance appear to be 
potentially classifiable in one of four ways, analytic a priori, analytic a posteriori, 
synthetic a priori, or synthetic a posteriori. Kant, however, assures us that the second 
classification may be taken as empty, 
 
. . . for it would be absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience. Since, in 
framing the judgment, I must not go outside my concept, there is no need to 
appeal to the testimony of experience in its support.8 
 
I pose a question, however, to which I shall return later: If the concept of the subject of 
an analytic judgment includes the concept of 'experience' as part of its definiens, is this 
not in effect 'appealing to the testimony of experience in its support'? In short, if a 
subject of an analytic judgment is defined in terms of 'experience' itself, must we not 
call the judgment a posteriori (remembering that an a priori judgment is 'absolutely 
independent of all experience [italics EWC]'? One would not expect, of course, to find 
many subjects so defined. But as I shall contend below, perhaps the vagueness and 
consequent unclarity of the terms 'transcendental object' and 'God' are due precisely to 
such a definitional quirk. Perhaps an analytic judgment with either term as subject is a 
posteriori by definition. 
 
How could this be so? and, if so, consequence? Let's look in turn, albeit summarily, at 
Kant's positions with regard to the 'transcendental object' and to the ontological proof 
for the existence of God. 
 
 
Kant on the 'Transcendental Object' 
 
All knowledge, to Kant, begins with experience, but our experience consists of 
representations. Representations, in turn, are representations either of other 
representations or of sensible appearances. But, by definition, an appearance is that 
which we experience through intuition of "something" that appears. 
 
 
8 Page 49  
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Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and 
that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But 
these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, 
which in turn have their object – and object which cannot itself be intuited by 
us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, 
transcendental object = x.9 
 
The transcendental object = x contains no determinate intuition, and is, as Kant himself 
insists, absolutely unknowable. 
 
The object to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, 
that is, the completely indeterminate thought of something in general. This 
cannot be entitled the noumenon; for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and 
have no concept of it save as merely the object of a sensible intuition in general, 
and so as being one and the same for all appearances.10 
 
Yet, by 'unknowable', it is clear that Kant does not mean that the existence of the 
transcendental object is in doubt! Rather, I cannot know what it is, although I can be 
assured that it is. "Appearances are only representations of things which are unknown 
as regards what they may be in themselves [italics EWC]."11 Indeed, to deny the 
existence of the transcendental object would be to distort the meaning of the word 
'appearance', for by appearance Kant meant that element of sensible intuition viewed 
as 'receptivity' which has the transcendental object as its 'ground'. 
 
. . . the same conclusion also, of course, follows from the concept of an 
appearance in general; namely, that something which is not in itself appearance 
must correspond to it. For appearance can be nothing by itself, outside our 
mode of representation. Unless, therefore, we are to move constantly in a 
circle, the word appearance must be recognized as already indicating a relation 
to something, the immediate representation of which is, indeed, sensible, but 
which, even apart from the constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form 
of our intuition is grounded), must be something in itself, that is, an object 
independent of sensibility.12 
 
 
9 Page 137. 
10 Page 271. 
11 Page 173. 
12 Pages 269-270. 
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Neither the transcendental object which underlies outer appearances nor that 
which underlies inner intuition, is itself either matter or a thinking being, but a 
ground (to us unknown) of the appearances which supply to us the empirical 
concept of the former as of the latter mode of existence.13 
 
To deny the existence of the transcendental object, therefore, would also be a 
distortion of the meaning of 'sensible intuition' viewed as 'receptivity' and of the 
meaning of 'transcendental object' itself. 
 
The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of being 
affected in a certain manner with representations  We may, however, entitle 
the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental 
object, but merely in order to have something corresponding to sensibility 
viewed as receptivity.14 
 
Any phenomenalistic interpretation of Kant, therefore, must stop at precisely this point. 
For Kant was as concerned that his theory of knowledge be non – Humean as non-
Leibnizean. The seeds of Kant’s experiential world did not consist of 'impressions' 
defined solipsistically. Rather, they consisted of 'appearances' that were defined as that 
aspect of the thing-in-itself that we experience through sensible intuition. In Kant’s 
view, therefore, we can offer by definition only one predicate of the thing-in-itself.  
 
(1) the thing-in itself is that which gives rise to the appearances that we 
experience.  
 
Another predicate, however, is entailed directly.  
 
(2) Consequently, the thing-in-itself exists, for appearances – as the basic 
constituents of experience – exist.  
 
We shall occasion to ponder (2) at greater length within the penultimate section of this 
essay ('The Alternatives'). 
 
(Note: I have not claimed that the Kantian thing-in-itself is either conceptually non-
vacuous nor philosophically justifiable in any way. I am simply asserting that Kant 
intentionally defined 'appearance' in such a way that the concept 'thing-in-itself' is 
thereby entailed. To look upon 'appearances' in a Humean fashion is to distort that 
which Kant intended to mean. And, although Hume’s view may ultimately prove to be 
more correct than Kant’s in regard to the actual ontological situation of the physical 
 
13 Page 352. 
14 Page 441. 
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world (whatever that may mean), this is not the question under consideration. I wish to 
examine two of Kant’s own positions, using Hume only as a useful philosophical foil.) 
 
 
Kant on the Ontological Proof  
for the Existence of God 
 
Kant’s criticism of the arguments in support of an ontological proof for the existence of 
God is much simpler to understand than the proofs themselves. He begins by agreeing 
that a definition of 'necessary existence' is possible and indeed that it can be given with 
no great difficulty. 
 
There is, of course, no difficulty in giving a verbal definition of the concept, 
namely, that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible.15 
 
Earlier Kant had accepted as sufficiently determined a concept of the transcendental 
object as 'unknowable' whose content consisted solely of the predicate definition 'that 
which is the ground of appearance'. But in the case of the concepts 'necessary existence' 
and 'God', Kant is dissatisfied. The definition of 'necessary existence' 
 
. . .  yields no insight into the conditions which make it necessary to regard the 
non- existence of a thing as absolutely unthinkable. It is precisely these 
conditions that we desire to know, in order that we may determine whether or 
not, in resorting to this concept, we are thinking anything at all.16 
 
To Kant, a concept of 'God' defined as 'that which necessarily exists' is empty,  
 
. . . for I cannot form the least concept of a thing which, should it be rejected 
with all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and in the absence of 
contradiction I have, through pure a priori concepts alone, no criterion of 
impossibility.17 
 
For either the predicate of a judgment adds something to the subject, and hence no 
contradiction can result in denying the predicate, or else the predicate is contained in 
the subject, and 'the assertion is a mere tautology'.18 
 
 
15 Page 501. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Page 503. 
18 Page 504. 
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We must ask: Is the proposition that this or that thing (which, whatever it may 
be, is allowed as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is 
analytic, the assertion of the existence of the thing adds nothing to the thought 
of the thing; but in that case either the thought, which is in us, is the thing itself, 
or we have presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible, 
and have then, on that pretext, inferred its existence from its internal possibility 
– which is nothing but a miserable tautology.19 
 
Thus, the problem of using 'existence' as a predicate is not a problem concerning 
analytic judgments, but only synthetic judgments, and one is being 'unreasonable' if one 
holds a contrary view. 
 
But if, on the other hand, we admit, as every reasonable person must, that all 
existential propositions are synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the 
predicate of existence cannot be rejected without contradiction? This is a 
feature which is found only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely what 
constitutes their analytic character.20 
 
Having ostensibly excluded the possibility that the judgment 'God exists' is analytic, Kant 
then proceeds to show that existence cannot be employed as a real predicate within a 
synthetic judgment. 
 
I shall not be concerned with Kant’s latter observations concerning the usage of 'exists' 
as a predicate within synthetic judgments, interesting though they may be, for I can 
make no sense at all of the traditional ontological argument if the judgment 'God exists' 
is taken to be synthetic – and I believe that neither Anselm nor Descartes would have 
understood, either. The question therefore becomes: has Kant succeeded in showing 
that a 'miserable tautology' cannot serve those ends to which the ontological proof is 
directed? Again I must remind the reader that I am not now concerned with the 
conclusions of Kant’s arguments against the proof itself from a neutral philosophical 
position. Rather, I wish to determine the limits of that which Kant can claim to have 
shown from within the framework of that system within which he also claimed to have 
sufficiently established the ontological status of the transcendental object. If the 
judgment 'God exists' can be established in an identical fashion to that by which the 
judgment 'The transcendental object exists' was established by Kant, then I believe 
either that Kant’s arguments against the possible validity of an ontological proof for the 
existence of God must be seen as inconclusive, or else that the concept of the 
transcendental object must be seen as vacuous and the Kantian philosophy viewed as 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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strictly phenomenalistic.21 In the following section of this paper I shall sketch the design 
of such an argument, using Kant’s own definitions and method, in the hope of 
demonstrating that one or the other of the above alternatives must be taken to be the 
case. 
 
The Alternatives 
 
Within the Kantian system, "all knowledge begins with experience".22 Kant was, of 
course, principally interested in establishing the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgments, but such judgments could not be said to be objective (that is, true of the 
experiential world) unless conforming to the appearances and representations that  
constitute our experience. (And, of course, it was Kant’s favorite method of establishing 
the categorical status of a judgment to withdraw from experience all extraneous 
elements, leaving behind only those which he could then consider necessary to the 
possibility of experience in general.) 
 
Within the Kantian system, therefore, the judgment 'I have experiences' may be taken 
to be analytic, for the concept 'I' (whether empirical or transcendental) cannot be 
thought except as a representation, and a representation is a constituent of my 
experience.23 Earlier I remarked that Kant defined an 'a priori judgment' as a judgment 
whose truth was "not . . . independent of this or that experience, but . . . absolutely 
independent of all experience".24 I do not understand, therefore, how the judgment 'I 
have experiences' could be said to be true 'absolutely independent of all experience', 
even if taken to be analytic, for the meaning of 'experience' itself is involved and hence 
dependence upon the content of at least experience-in-general seems to be 
inescapable. 
 
I believe therefore that the truth of the judgment 'I have experiences' is fundamental to 
the Kantian enterprise and is indeed analytic a posteriori by definition. 
       
(1)  I have experiences. (experience [by definition being] = that which I have) 
 
 
21 Although Kant, of course, never used the sentence 'The transcendental object exists', 
I do not believe that I am distorting his position by using it. I am using 'exists' with precisely the 
same meaning that Kant intended when he remarked "There can be no question  that I am 
conscious of my representations; these representations and I myself, who have the 
representations, therefore exist." (Page 356). 
22 Page 41. 
23 See, for example Kant's extended note to the Preface to the Second Edition of the 
first Critique, reproduced on pages 34-36.  
24 Page 43. 
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It should now be noted that any analytic judgment entailed by (1) is likewise a posteriori 
by definition. 
 
As indicated earlier, Kant looked upon experience as consisting of representations either 
of sensible appearances or of other representations, the former being the fundamental 
building-blocks of all experience as intuited through the sensible intuition viewed as 
receptivity. But the word 'appearance' was selected by Kant for a specific reason: its 
meaning entails 'something' that appears. Thus we have (2) by definition. 
 
(2)  appearances = [by definition being]  
 
(a) the fundamental constituents of experience; and  
(b) that of which the transcendental object is the ground. 
 
By (1) and (2), therefore, the analytic a posteriori judgment (3) is entailed. 
 
(3)  The transcendental object exists. (or, 'There is a transcendental object') 
 
Briefly summarized, if I have experiences consisting partially of appearances, and 
appearances entail by definition the existence of "something" that appears, then, if the 
"something" is by definition called 'transcendental object', the latter exists. (It must be 
remembered that Kant himself insisted that the only characteristic predicable of the 
thing-in-itself was its own definiens, but that this was sufficient to establish the concept 
as non-vacuous.) 
 
I shall now specify an ontological proof for the existence of God. Since Kant remarked, 
"there can be no doubt that I am conscious of my representations",25 I shall define 
'consciousness', following Kant but with a slight addition of my own, as follows: 
 
(4) consciousness = [by definition]  
 
(a) that in virtue of which experience is possible; and  
(b) that of whose possibility God is the ground. 
 
[Note: 'God' is being defined solely as 'the ground of the 
possibility of consciousness'.] 
 
 
25 Page 346. 
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(1) and (4), then, entail the analytic a posteriori judgment (5). 
 
(5)  God exists. (or, 'There is a God') 
 
Briefly summarized, if I could not have experiences without being conscious, and I do 
have experiences, then, if being conscious is impossible without the presence of God by 
definition, the latter exists. 
 
I make no claim, of course, that the God whose existence has been proven should be 
worshipped, feared, or indeed said to possess any other predicates than those defined. I 
have only claimed, as did Kant with the transcendental object, that the single 
characteristic predicable of the object is its own definiens, and that  this is sufficient in 
the same sense and to the same degree to establish the concept as non-vacuous. The 
two proofs offered above are, I believe, strictly parallel in structure and method. 
 
 
 
As with judgment (1), judgments (3) and (5) are most precisely characterized as being 
analytic a posteriori. They are a posteriori, for they depend for their truth upon the 
meaning of 'experience' itself. They are analytic, and hence necessarily true, for they are 
derived solely from a definition and a single analytic judgment in each respective case. 
In keeping with tradition, therefore, the God of (5) is an entity whose non-existence is 
strictly unthinkable. The proof is hence an 'ontological' demonstration in the classical 
sense. 
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Conclusion 
 
I did not wish in this essay to argue either for the clarity or unclarity of the concepts of 
the Kantian 'transcendental object' and of 'God', or for their acceptability or 
unacceptability as philosophical tools or theological entities. Rather, I wished to 
demonstrate that the concept of 'God' as employed in an ontological proof could not be 
dismissed by Kant as being either vacuous or pertaining to nothing existing, unless he 
were also willing to place his own system of philosophy within the category of pure 
Humean phenomenalism. 
 
I am well aware that the intricacies of the Kantian philosophy are many and varied, and 
that one must tread critically with great caution. The basic contention of this paper, 
however, arose out of a deepening sense of perplexity: I found myself unable to 
understand the Kantian 'transcendental object' except as a term contained within a 
'miserable tautology' – which is precisely why Kant rejected the proposed analyticity of 
the judgment 'God exists' as being based upon a misunderstanding. Perhaps the 
confusion is mine alone; but, God and Kant for- give me, I don’t think so. 
 
 
